Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation by Deffenbacher, Kenneth A. et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Faculty Publications, Department of Psychology Psychology, Department of 
2008 
Forgetting the Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an 
Eyewitness’s Memory Representation 
Kenneth A. Deffenbacher 
University of Nebraska–Omaha 
Brian H. Bornstein 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, bbornstein2@unl.edu 
E. Kiernan McGorty 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Steven D. Penrod 
John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub 
 Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Deffenbacher, Kenneth A.; Bornstein, Brian H.; McGorty, E. Kiernan; and Penrod, Steven D., "Forgetting the 
Once-Seen Face: Estimating the Strength of an Eyewitness’s Memory Representation" (2008). Faculty 
Publications, Department of Psychology. 374. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/psychfacpub/374 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology, Department of at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications, 
Department of Psychology by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
Unless the state possesses incriminating physical evidence, 
eyewitness identification testimony is crucial whenever the 
prosecution attempts to prove that the defendant and the per-
petrator are one and the same. The reliability of an identifica-
tion is affected by two classes of variables, system variables 
and estimator variables (Wells, 1978). System variables are 
those under the control of the criminal justice system, instruc-
tions given to eyewitnesses before they consider a lineup or 
photospread or the method by which members of the lineup 
other than the suspect are chosen, for instance. Estimator vari-
ables are those beyond the control of the criminal justice sys-
tem and whose effects can only be estimated. These factors in-
clude, among many other estimator variables, the duration of 
the eyewitness’s exposure to the perpetrator, lighting condi-
tions at the crime scene, and retention interval, the length of 
the interval between observation of the suspect and test of the 
eyewitness’s memory.
Given the controllability of system variables, a consider-
able amount of research has been focused on them, given the 
greater promise that such research would lead to increases in 
the reliability of eyewitness memory testing procedures. In-
deed, sufficient research progress on system variables had ac-
cumulated in the last 2 decades of the 20th century that the 
U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines for the collec-
tion of eyewitness evidence based on these findings (Techni-
cal Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). Police in a 
number of jurisdictions around the United States have already 
adopted these guidelines as standard practice.
Progress in producing forensically useful empirical gener-
alizations has not been nearly as great in the case of estimator 
variables. Nevertheless, research on these variables may have 
the potential to produce not only greater understanding of sit-
uations in which eyewitnesses may experience perceptual or 
memorial problems but also to yield empirical generalizations 
that may assist the trier of fact (judge or juror) when he or she 
must assess the fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory representa-
tion (cf. Wells, Memon, & Penrod, 2006).
In making this assessment, the key estimator variables are 
initial memory strength for the perpetrator’s face and length 
of the retention interval. Many other estimator variables have 
their effect only as they affect initial memory strength. These 
variables include duration of exposure to the perpetrator, il-
lumination conditions, presence or absence of other foci of at-
tention (e.g., a weapon), eyewitness stress level, and whether 
the perpetrator is of a different race, among others. To make 
a proper assessment, the trier of fact would not only need to 
have an estimate of the witness’s initial memory strength for 
the perpetrator and to know the length of the retention inter-
val but also to understand the nature of the forgetting func-
tion for the human face. The forgetting function, of course, is 
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Abstract
The fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory representation is an issue of paramount forensic concern. Psychological science has been un-
able to offer more than vague generalities concerning the relation of retention interval to memory trace strength for the once-seen face. A 
meta-analysis of 53 facial memory studies produced a highly reliable association (r = .18, d = 0.37) between longer retention intervals and 
positive forgetting of once-seen faces, an effect equally strong for both face recognition and eyewitness identification studies. W. A. Wick-
elgren’s (1974, 1975, 1977) theory of recognition memory provided statistically satisfactory fits to 11 different empirical forgetting func-
tions. Applied to the results of field studies of eyewitness memory, the theory yields predictions relevant to fact finders’ evaluations of 
eyewitness credibility. A plausible upper limit for witness initial memory strength corresponds to a probability of .67 of being correct on a 
fair six-person lineup. Furthermore, not only can the percentage of remaining memory strength be determined for any retention interval, 
but this strength estimate can be translated into an estimated probability of being correct on a fair lineup of a specified size.
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the curve that specifies the strength of the memory represen-
tation over the retention interval. That is, the forgetting func-
tion specifies how rapidly memory strength, plotted on the or-
dinate of the graph, decreases as a function of time, plotted on 
the abscissa. Knowing the rate of memory strength loss and 
retention interval length allows one to specify the proportion 
of original memory strength remaining. To specify in absolute 
terms how much memory strength remains, one must know 
the initial memory strength, the “starting point” on the ordi-
nate of the forgetting function.
Typically, the length of the retention interval for an eyewit-
ness can easily be established to a reasonable degree of preci-
sion from information provided in police reports. Until now, 
however, psychological science has not had a means to pro-
vide at least a ballpark estimate of initial memory strength for 
a witness. Furthermore, cognitive psychologists have not es-
tablished whether the forgetting curve for the human face is 
even of the same form as Ebbinghaus (1913) had determined. 
For that matter, it has not always been abundantly clear 
whether there even is a statistically reliable association be-
tween retention interval length and facial recognition memory 
(Deffenbacher, 1986). For example, in the period between 1970 
(approximately the beginning of modern research on eyewit-
ness testimony) and 1985, studies testing the effect of retention 
interval length on memory for the human face included a sub-
stantial minority reporting a null effect. An initial meta-analy-
sis of this literature by Deffenbacher (1986) included 15 studies 
reporting a null effect out of a total of 33 studies, even though 
overall he found a highly reliable effect (p < .0001) of memory 
test delay on face recognition memory: The average z was 1.46, 
yielding a meta-analytic Z of 8.38 and an equivalent correla-
tion of .25 (as retention interval or delay increased, forgetting 
increased). Including retention interval as part of a much more 
comprehensive meta-analysis than Deffenbacher’s, Shapiro 
and Penrod (1986) also documented statistically reliable effects 
of retention interval length on face recognition memory.
With results of these previous meta-analyses in hand, 
an immediate attempt to describe the forgetting function 
for once-seen faces might seem in order. However, there are 
good reasons to conduct a more up-to-date meta-analysis of 
face memory studies before searching for a suitable theoreti-
cal forgetting function. In the more than 2 decades since 1986, 
the published body of research findings concerning the effect 
of delay has increased by more than 60%. The number of null 
or negative (“negative” forgetting or reminiscence) results has 
also continued to increase.
A further concern is the proportion of studies that have 
been conducted in the context of the eyewitness identification 
paradigm rather than with the standard face recognition task 
in the tradition of cognitive psychology. The eyewitness iden-
tification paradigm usually exposes witnesses to a single target 
face (perpetrator) in a scripted scenario. Memory for this face is 
tested by embedding it in a 5- to 9-person live or photo lineup 
(target present) or by substituting someone else who is a match 
to the perpetrator’s description (target absent). Witnesses are 
asked to identify the perpetrator or to indicate that he or she is 
not present. The recognition memory task, on the other hand, 
exposes observers to a relatively large number of target faces. 
A recognition memory test typically includes the target set plus 
an equal number of unfamiliar distracter faces. Observers are 
exposed to faces serially and are to respond “yes” or “no” as to 
whether a given face has been seen previously. It turns out that 
the proportion of eyewitness identification studies has more 
than doubled, increasing from 27% of published studies con-
cerned with the effect of delayed memory test in Deffenbach-
er’s (1986) meta-analysis to 57% at present.
As a result, not only has there been a considerable increase 
in the proportion of studies with greater forensic applicability, 
but it is entirely possible that the effect size for retention inter-
val could be different for eyewitness identification studies than 
for face recognition studies. Consider one possibility. Results of 
face recognition memory studies have typically been assumed 
to represent high estimates of the amount of facial memory ob-
taining in real-world eyewitness identification settings. If eye-
witness identification studies did indeed produce lower es-
timates of initial memory strength than did face recognition 
memory studies, then there would be less room for the decline 
of any forgetting function to occur. Thus, retention interval ef-
fects might be less for studies in the eyewitness identification 
paradigm because of the greater probability of a restriction of 
range in possible loss of memory strength, as compared with 
face recognition studies. On the other hand, the direction of a 
difference in the effect size for retention interval could well be 
in the opposite direction. A number of published meta-analy-
ses of the effects of other independent variables have yielded 
generally larger effects on memory for eyewitness identifica-
tion studies then for laboratory face recognition studies. For in-
stance, Deffenbacher, Bornstein, Penrod, and McGorty (2004) 
found a considerably larger negative effect of heightened stress 
on memory for witnesses in studies conducted in the more fo-
rensically relevant eyewitness identification tradition than for 
witnesses in face recognition studies.
For all these reasons, before attempting a theoretical de-
scription of the forgetting function for face memory, we 
deemed it advisable to conduct an up-to-date meta-analysis of 
the effects of retention interval on the strength of a witness’s 
memory representation for the once-seen face. We next pres-
ent the methodology followed and the results obtained from 
this meta-analysis.
Meta-Analysis of Retention Interval Effects
Method
Sample characteristics. Clark (2005), Deffenbacher et al. 
(2004), and Reisberg and Heuer (2007) have all agreed that the 
legal standards for proffered scientific testimony established 
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (1993) have strength-
ened the legal system’s preference for meta-analytic conclu-
sions based on a body of well-conceived, well-executed, and 
easily retrievable studies. Hence, we made the decision to in-
clude only published studies in our sample. A thorough search 
of relevant citation retrieval systems was made. These systems 
included PsycINFO, Medline, and Social SciSearch (the So-
cial Science Citation Index). We also examined the citations in 
published research and in social science convention proceed-
ings. The present study sample consists of 39 published arti-
cles, books, and book chapters. These sources, listed in Table 
1, generated 53 independent tests (N = 5,405) of the hypoth-
esis that longer retention intervals have a negative effect on 
memory strength for the once-seen face. Individual sample 
sizes ranged considerably, from a low of 8 to a high of 590 (M 
= 101.98). Retention intervals associated with these studies 
ranged from 1 s to 350 days. 
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Table 1. Effect Sizes for Proportion Correct Recognition Memory or Identification Accuracy
Study  n  RI                                                z                            r
Scapinello & Yarmey (1970)  40  20 min  0.00  .00
Smith & Nielsen (1970)  144  10 s  3.30  .28
Wallace et al. (1970)
     Children  200  5 min  0.00  .00
     Adults  200  5 min  0.00  .00
Goldstein & Chance (1971)  52  2 days  0.00  .00
Shepherd & Ellis (1973)  36  35 days  1.92  .32
Laughery et al. (1974)  292  1 week  0.00  .00
Chance et al. (1975)  144  2 days  0.00  .00
Egan et al. (1977)  86  54 days  1.65  .18
Davies et al. (1978)  40  19 days  1.96  .31
Walker-Smith (1978)  8  19 s 2.58  .91
Yarmey (1979)  84  30 days  2.32  .25
Ellis et al. (1980)  48  1 week  2.58  .37
Courtois & Mueller (1981)  128  28 days  2.76  .24
Deffenbacher et al. (1981): Control: 2 min/2 wk  22  2 weeks  1.96  .42
Krouse (1981)  76  2.5 days  2.58  .30
Mauldin & Laughery (1981)  100  47.5 hr  0.00  .00
Barkowitz and Brigham (1982)  237  1 week  2.58  .17
Brigham et al. (1982)  88  22 hr  5.65  .60
Shepherd et al. (1982)
     Experiment 2  40  343 days  3.58  .57
     Experiment 3  104  90 days  –0.72  –.07
Krafka & Penrod (1985)
     TP/no context  24  22 hr  –0.22  –.04
     TP/context  20  22 hr  0.45  .10
     TA/no context  21  22 hr  2.16  .47
     TA/context  20  22 hr  1.41  .32
Cutler et al. (1986): Experiment 2  287  23 days  2.75  .16
Chance & Goldstein (1987)  59  5 days  0.00  .00
Cutler et al. (1987a)  165  1 week  –1.60  –.12
Cutler et al. (1987b)  290  12 days  –0.47  –.03
Peters (1988)  212  6 days  0.00  .00
Read et al. (1989)
     Early rehearsal  68  1 week  2.63  .32
     Late rehearsal  68  1 week  –1.30  –.16
Ellis & Flin (1990)  153  1 week  1.96  .16
Podd (1990)  90  2 weeks   1.75 .18
Read et al. (1990)  90  100 min  0.00  .00
Goodman et al. (1991)  48  4.5 days  1.04  .15
Peters (1991)
     Experiment 1  71  26 days  0.00  .00
     Experiment 3  64  13 days  0.00  .00
Shepherd et al. (1991)  96  1 month  1.96 .20
Wixted & Ebbesen (1991): Experiment 2  195  2 weeks  2.81  .20
Yarmey et al. (1996)
     TP:5 min/24 hr  69  24 hr  1.45  .17
     TA: 5 min/24 hr  76  24 hr  0.82  .09
     Sh/TP: 5 min/24 hr  69  24 hr  1.29  .16
     Sh/TA: 5 min/24 hr  70  24 hr  3.05  .36
Peters (1997): Experiment 2  96  6 months  3.00  .31
MacLin et al. (2001)  64  30 min  1.34  .17
Memon et al. (2003)
     Older adults: TP  45  1 week  1.86  .28
     Younger adults: TP  42  1 week  0.40  .06
     Older adults: TA  42  1 week  3.75  .58
     Younger adults: TA  42  1 week  –0.97  –.15
Yarmey (2004)  590  4 hr  0.00  .00
Brewer et al. (2006)
     TP  37  30 min  0.00  .00
     TA  66  30 min  0.00  .00
RI = length of delay between shortest and longest retention intervals. TP = target present lineup; TA = target absent lineup; Sh = showup.
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Statistical procedures. As we always compared the longest 
and shortest retention intervals in each study to determine 
effect size, we selected z scores for a difference between pro-
portions as the primary dependent measure. For the studies 
in our sample, a z score for a difference between proportions 
was occasionally reported or, more often, could be calculated 
post hoc. In instances in which a test of the hypothesis was 
reported as not statistically significant, but no statistics were 
cited, we followed the conservative procedure of entering a z 
of zero (Rosenthal, 1995). Otherwise, we entered a z score as-
sociated with the p value of the effect size estimate, 1.65 for p = 
.05, one-tailed, for instance.
To test the statistical reliability of any estimate of typical 
effect size, we calculated a one-sample t test and an associ-
ated 95% confidence interval (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2002). 
Given that r and d are more frequently encountered mea-
sures of effect size, and in the case of r, may be a more gen-
erally useful measure, we have reported mean effect sizes in 
terms of r and d as well. In the case of r, we first converted 
the z-score measures of effect size for each study to r by di-
viding z by the square root of n, a conversion formula rec-
ommended by Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2002). Each of these 
biserial correlation coefficients between retention interval 
(short or long) and memory accuracy was then normalized 
by conversion to the equivalent Fisher’s z′ score before aver-
aging. Values of Cohen’s d equivalent to the mean effect size 
expressed in terms of r were obtained by use of the expres-
sion d = 2 r (1 − r 2)−1/2.
Results and Discussion
For each study, we subtracted the proportion correct asso-
ciated with the longer retention interval from the proportion 
correct associated with the shorter retention interval. Thus, a 
positive result represented positive forgetting, a loss of mem-
ory. A negative result represented negative forgetting, or rem-
iniscence. When we report effect size in terms of r, then a pos-
itive r means that longer retention intervals were associated 
with more forgetting.
The unweighted mean r was .18, significantly different 
from zero, t(52) = 4.78, p < .005, with the 95% confidence in-
terval (CI) extending from .10 to .26. The mean effect size for r 
in this instance is equivalent to d = 0.37, a small to medium ef-
fect size (Cohen, 1988). We should note that when all possible 
pairwise comparisons of retention intervals in studies that had 
more than two retention intervals were treated as independent 
effect sizes, the sample size increased from 53 to 78, and the 
mean effect size was .17 (d = 0.34), remarkably close to the re-
sults we obtained when only the longest and shortest retention 
intervals were compared.
We next applied a test of homogeneity of variances across 
the sample of weighted effect sizes to determine whether the 
degree of variability exceeded that expected on the basis of 
sampling error alone. A chi-square value of 23.19 (df = 52, p 
> .05) indicated that the degree of variability did not exceed 
that expected on the basis of sampling error. Strictly speaking, 
then, no moderator analyses were required. However, given 
our prediction that studies conducted in the context of the eye-
witness identification paradigm might well show more or even 
less of an effect of retention interval on memory strength as 
compared with face recognition studies, we nevertheless cal-
culated mean effect sizes across 23 face recognition memory 
studies and 30 eyewitness identification studies. In the former 
case, the mean r was .21, t(22) = 3.18, p < .005, 95% CI = .08–
.34; in the latter case, it was .16, t(29) = 3.58, p < .005, 95% CI 
= .07–.25. However, the difference between these two correla-
tions was not significant by a two-sample t test, t(51) = .21, p > 
.05. Hence, nature of the research paradigm was not a modera-
tor of average effect size.
Post hoc, it was suggested to us that a particularly strong 
moderator of the effect size for delay might be the duration of 
delay itself. In the third column of Table 1 (RI), we have in-
cluded the length of delay between the shortest and longest 
retention intervals for each study in our sample. Noting that 
the most commonly encountered delay for British police has 
been a month (Pike, Brace, & Kynan, 2002), we estimated the 
average r to be .27, t(6) = 3.39, p < .01, 95% CI = .08–.44, for the 
seven studies with delays of a month or more. For studies with 
lesser durations of delay, we estimated the average r to be .17, 
t(45) = 3.99, p < .005, 95% CI = .08–.25. The difference in mag-
nitude of these two correlations suggests that duration of the 
memory test delay itself might moderate effect size. This con-
jecture cannot be supported, however, because the difference 
between effect sizes at shorter and longer durations of delay 
was not significant, t(51) = .38, p > .05. Even so, it is interesting 
to note that the upper bound of the confidence interval for the 
studies with a maximum delay of a month or more was .44, as 
compared with a comparable figure of .25 for studies with a 
maximum delay of less than a month.
Thus, despite 22 of the sample of 53 effect sizes being null 
or negative, we have found a statistically reliable effect size 
estimate for the effect of retention interval on proportion of 
correct recognition judgments, a measure of memory accuracy 
for the human face. Furthermore, our effect size estimate does 
not vary as a function of whether it is a product of studies 
done in the face recognition memory paradigm or of studies 
conducted in the eyewitness identification tradition. Hence, it 
is reasonable to conclude that increased delay of a test for rec-
ognition memory for the once-seen face portends decreased 
probability of correct recognition judgments. This decreased 
probability presumably reflects loss of underlying memory 
trace strength.
Our estimate of the effect size for retention interval on 
memory for faces is also likely an underestimate of the ac-
tual value. The 28% of studies reporting forgetting effects 
that were not statistically significant but for which no statis-
tics were cited resulted in our entering a conservative value 
of z = 0.00 in each instance. Most likely a small but positive 
amount of forgetting was actually exhibited by participants 
in such studies.
Our meta-analyses put us in a better position to specify 
what happens over time to a person’s memory representa-
tion for an unfamiliar face. At least now we can say with 
some assurance that memory strength will be weaker at lon-
ger retention intervals than at briefer ones. However, our 
meta-analyses do not permit us to specify the shape of the 
forgetting function and answers to related questions, such 
as whether the memory representation will ever be truly 
lost, much less when. To address these questions, we would 
need to be able to specify a theoretical forgetting function 
that would satisfactorily fit empirical forgetting functions, 
particularly for studies in which facial recognition mem-
ory was tested at three or more retention intervals. The lat-
ter requirement would enable us to assess fit to nonlinear 
functions.
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Finding a Theoretical Forgetting Function  
for the Human Face
Criteria
As indicated earlier, the trier of fact has had no useful way 
to estimate the initial strength of an eyewitness’s memory rep-
resentation for the once-seen face. Clearly, for it to have fo-
rensic applicability, any candidate theoretical forgetting func-
tion must (a) be able to provide an estimate of initial memory 
strength; (b) be accurate at predicting where future points will 
fall as retention interval increases, a strong test of the theory 
(Wixted & Carpenter, 2007); and (c) be able to satisfactorily fit 
group forgetting data, the form in which empirical forgetting 
functions exist in studies of memory for the human face in-
cluded in our meta-analyses.
If a theoretical forgetting function is found that meets these 
criteria, eyewitness memory researchers should finally have ev-
idence bearing directly on their belief that the forgetting func-
tion for the once-seen face is Ebbinghausian in nature. That is, 
93% of experts in the field of eyewitness testimony research, 
when surveyed most recently (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 
2001), agreed that there was a research basis for the notion 
that the rate of memory loss for an event is greatest right af-
ter an event and then levels off over time. A still large major-
ity (83%) of these same experts agreed that this generalization 
was reliable enough for psychologists to present in courtroom 
testimony. There has been little direct evidence provided to 
date, however, that the faith of these experts is justified when 
it comes to specifying the forgetting function for the once-seen 
human face. Consider the critique provided by Elliott (1993): 
The Ebbinghaus forgetting curve … is another dubi-
ous metaphor for most eyewitness circumstances, both be-
cause the human face seems to have special properties as a 
stimulus, and because the retention intervals that are per-
tinent to identification scarcely ever include the very short 
ones where most forgetting presumably occurs. There is 
now a large enough number of results that are null or neg-
ative with respect to the Ebbinghaus hypothesis that their 
presence ought certainly to form part of any testimony 
that might be given: They should no longer be treated sim-
ply as error. (p. 429)
Selection of a Theory of Forgetting
The only theory meeting the first criterion for forensic ap-
plicability, provision of an estimate of initial memory strength 
at 0 s after stimulus cessation, is Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 
1977, 1979) single-trace fragility theory of recognition memory. 
Thus, Wickelgren’s theory is the only one that we evaluate for 
its ability to meet the remaining two criteria. In its least com-
plex version (Wickelgren, 1975, 1977), the form of the retention 
function is m = Lt−De−It, where m represents memory strength 
at a given retention interval, t seconds after target stimulus ex-
posure has ended; L is initial memory strength at 0 s after stim-
ulus exposure ends; D is the rate parameter for a time-decay 
process, which is inversely proportional to the rate of mem-
ory consolidation; and I is the rate parameter for the loss of 
memory strength due to interference, which is directly propor-
tional to the similarity of the target stimulus to subsequently 
encountered stimuli. Of course e = 2.72, the base of the natural 
or Naperian system of logarithms. It is important to note that 
Wickelgren (1974) proposed that at least for recognition mem-
ory, an interval-scale measurement of memory strength (d′) 
is possible by making relatively weak, yet plausible assump-
tions concerning how statistical decision theory would trans-
late strength into yes–no decisions. For all practical purposes, 
then, both m and L are measured in terms of d′ units.
Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory is unique 
in that rather than distinguishing between short- and long-
term traces, it posits a single memory trace and two mecha-
nisms productive of forgetting. An interference-free, time-de-
cay process produces rapid forgetting in the first seconds and 
minutes of the retention interval because initially trace fragil-
ity is very high. As the neurophysiological process of consoli-
dation begins to decrease trace fragility, however, the rate of 
forgetting slows in a negatively accelerated fashion, and less 
is forgotten per unit time. Consolidation, showing a nega-
tively accelerated increase over time, is assumed to continue 
to decrease trace fragility and its susceptibility to the time-de-
cay process throughout the life of the memory trace. The neg-
ative power component of Wickelgren’s forgetting function, 
t−D, would appear to be a plausible model of the negatively ac-
celerated loss of trace fragility over time and therefore the con-
tinually decreasing amount of trace strength lost per unit time.
As the contribution of the time-decay process to forgetting 
declines in power function fashion with increases in the reten-
tion interval, the second process, a storage interference process, 
operating in a negative exponential fashion (e−It), would be ex-
pected to increase its influence on the rate of forgetting at lon-
ger retention intervals. This prediction might explain a result 
noted by Deffenbacher, Carr, and Leu (1981), who found that 
for recognition memory of both faces and words, the amount of 
forgetting due to retroactive interference with an item’s trace in 
storage increased over a 2-week retention interval.
We should note that a simpler version of Wickelgren’s 
(1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory has been proposed (e.g., 
Wixted & Carpenter, 2007). This version, in effect, contains 
only two free parameters, initial memory strength and the rate 
of forgetting due to time decay. The version we have selected 
(Wickelgren, 1974, 1975, 1977) contains a third parameter, rate 
of forgetting due to interference generated subsequent to en-
coding of the stimulus. It would be prudent to justify the ne-
cessity of the additional free parameter.
We have found it necessary to retain the interference pa-
rameter to secure an adequate fit to empirical forgetting func-
tions that included retention intervals greater than 1–2 weeks 
in length. The two-parameter version provides about the same 
degree of fit as the three-parameter one for retention intervals 
up to this length. At longer intervals, however, face recognition 
memory appears to require a source of forgetting in addition to 
time decay. Values of the time-decay parameter sufficient for a 
good fit at shorter intervals were not sufficient to account for 
the considerable additional forgetting at longer intervals. In-
deed, a plot of log memory strength (d′) against log time re-
veals a downward inflection in empirical forgetting functions 
that occurs between an interval corresponding to about 1 week 
and ones corresponding to a month or more (Deffenbacher, 
1986). Interestingly, Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) 
found in their analysis of 314 lineups conducted by the London 
Metropolitan Police that the probability of identifying the sus-
pect decreased drastically in the interval between 1 week and 
1 month, declining from .66 to .34. Finally, face recognition in 
a forensic context often includes an institutional source of in-
terference subsequent to encoding of the perpetrator’s face, the 
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exposure of the witness to mugshots before a memory test by 
means of a live or photographic lineup (Deffenbacher, Born-
stein, & Penrod, 2006). This sort of interference could be prob-
lematic if the later lineup were a target-absent one.
Previous Tests of the Theory
In the first decade after the introduction of the single-trace 
fragility theory of forgetting in the 1970s, a modest amount of 
empirical support was generated. For instance, Wickelgren 
(1972, 1974, 1975) found that the theory provided an excellent 
fit to forgetting functions obtained for episodic memory repre-
sentations for frequently encountered words and for pictures 
of commonly encountered objects. In the three publications 
just cited, Wickelgren reported a dozen experiments resulting 
in 35 separate r2 statistics, averaged across 3–10 research par-
ticipants in each instance. The median r2 was .89, the propor-
tion of empirical forgetting function variance accounted for by 
single-trace fragility theory. All these experiments used yes–no 
recognition memory tasks, with memory for verbal and picto-
rial materials being tested under a variety of conditions and 
measured at retention intervals up to 2 years in length.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been only two 
previously published attempts to fit any theory of forgetting 
to face recognition memory forgetting functions. Deffenbacher 
(1986) not only conducted a meta-analysis of memory for the 
once-seen face as a function of retention interval but also con-
ducted a preliminary test of the ability of Wickelgren’s (1972, 
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) single-trace fragility (power-exponen-
tial) theory to fit empirical forgetting functions for face recog-
nition memory. He found that Wickelgren’s power-exponen-
tial theory provided relatively good fits to the functions from 
five different studies. Wixted and Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 
2) showed that a simple power function was an excellent fit to 
their empirical forgetting function for face recognition mem-
ory tested at retention intervals ranging from 1 hr to 2 weeks 
in length.
Unfortunately, except for the single effort of Wixted and 
Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 2), neither Deffenbacher nor any-
one else ever followed up these first curve-fitting forays with 
any further theory testing or development in regard to the for-
getting of faces. Furthermore, neither Deffenbacher nor anyone 
else ever made a serious attempt to determine to what extent 
either Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-expo-
nential theory or any other theory of forgetting might have fo-
rensic application. In the next section, we attempt to remedy 
the first of these two deficiencies. We remedy the second defi-
ciency in a subsequent section.
New Tests of the Theory
Table 2 illustrates the results of our fitting Wickelgren’s 
(1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to 11 
empirical forgetting functions obtained from the face recogni-
tion memory and eyewitness identification literatures. These 
11 data sets were obtained from studies that included at least 
three retention intervals, that obtained a significant effect for 
retention interval (positive forgetting), and for which sufficient 
information was provided to calculate d′ values as a measure 
of memory strength at each of the tested retention intervals. 
Table 2. Fit of Single-Trace Fragility Theory to Empirical Forgetting Functions
Study                                                               Observed and (predicted) d′ memory strength after various delays
 0 s  5 min  2 days  7 days
Barkowitz & Brigham (1982)  (1.70)  1.47 (1.47)  1.19 (1.24)  1.14 (1.18)
 0 s  10 min  2 days  7 days
Chance & Goldstein (1987)
    White faces  (2.49)  2.12 (2.12)  1.96 (1.82)  1.61 (1.72)
    Japanese faces  (1.53)  1.30 (1.30)  1.02 (1.02)  0.88 (0.76)
 0 s  1 min  2 days  28 days
Courtois & Mueller (1981)  (3.26)  2.94 (2.94)  2.41 (2.39)  1.93 (1.95)
 0 s  5 min  1 day  7 days
Ellis & Flin (1990)
    7 years/2-s encoding time  (1.13)  0.98 (0.98)  0.74 (0.84)  0.70 (0.72)
    10 years/2-s encoding time  (1.78)  1.54 (1.54)  0.98 (1.20)  0.72 (0.62)
    10 years/6-s encoding time  (1.98)  1.72 (1.72)  1.72 (1.47)  1.23 (1.26)
 0 s  3 min  6 days  35 days
Shepherd & Ellis (1973)  (1.97)  1.73 (1.73)  1.24 (1.28)  0.78 (0.74)
 0 s  7 days  30 days  90 days  350 days
Shepherd, Ellis, & Davies (1982)  (2.78)  1.92 (1.92)  1.62 (1.64)  1.47 (1.17)  0.00 (0.29)
 0 s  1 hr  1 day  1 week  2 weeks
Wixted & Ebbesen (1991, Experiment 2)  (2.47)  2.01 (2.01)  1.75 (1.83)  1.46 (1.57)  1.41 (1.37)
 0 s  1 min  7 days  30 days
Yarmey (1979)  (3.39)  3.12 (3.12)  2.44 (2.30)  1.47 (1.50)
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Six of the data sets were obtained from studies published since 
Deffenbacher’s (1986) preliminary test of Wickelgren’s theory 
of forgetting.
We should note that these 11 functions were of necessity 
fitted by eye so as to minimize the sum of absolute devia-
tions of predicted and observed values. Least-squares or max-
imum likelihood estimates of parameter values were not pos-
sible, given that each forgetting function contained only three 
or four retention intervals and that the observed values at each 
retention interval were group d′ scores.
Fortunately, we were able to begin our curve-fitting exercise 
by taking advantage of parameter values required to fit Wick-
elgren’s (1975) data for frequently encountered English words 
and Ryback, Weinert, and Fozard′s (1970) data for recognition 
of pictures of common everyday objects. We discovered, how-
ever, that the value of the time-decay parameter needed to fit 
our data for unfamiliar faces was only one-tenth that required 
for the data by Wickelgren (1975) and Ryback et al. (1970). The 
same value of the time-decay parameter (.025) provided good 
fits for 10 of the 11 forgetting curves. A value of .02 improved 
the fit slightly for the remaining study (Yarmey, 1979). Val-
ues of the interference parameter that we used here were up 
to an order of magnitude smaller (6 × 10−8) than that required 
to fit the data of Wickelgren (1975) and Ryback et al. (1970), 6 × 
10−7. The forgetting data from Barkowitz and Brigham (1982), 
Courtois and Mueller (1981), and Shepherd, Ellis, and Davies 
(1982) and Chance and Goldstein’s (1987) data from Cauca-
sians viewing Caucasian faces were fit with the 6 × 10−8 value 
of the interference parameter, and the data from the remaining 
seven studies were fit by values of the interference parameter 
that were up to 16 times greater.
The values provided in the 0-s column of Table 2 are esti-
mates of L, the initial memory strength parameter. Given that 
all the data for memory measurement as a function of reten-
tion interval were group, rather than individual, in nature, 
and given the lack of any previously established estimates of 
initial memory strength for unfamiliar faces, we obtained ini-
tial strength estimates by substituting for the predicted value 
of d′ in Wickelgren’s (1975, 1977) equation the observed value 
of d′ obtained from the first retention interval at which face 
memory was measured and then solving for L. It should there-
fore not be surprising that the predicted and observed values 
match perfectly at the first retention interval for each forget-
ting function. Clearly, any statistical assessment of the ade-
quacy of fit includes only the degree of fit at retention intervals 
subsequent to the first. This approach also permits assessment 
of how well the theory predicts where future points will fall as 
retention interval increases beyond Time 0.
A statistical assessment of the fit of Wickelgren’s (1972, 
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to the 11 em-
pirical face forgetting functions was made by applying a chi-
square goodness-of-fit test in each instance. In no instance was 
the chi-square test significant. Hence, in each case the null hy-
pothesis that both observed and predicted values represent 
the same forgetting function could not be rejected. An omni-
bus chi-square test of the fit of retention interval data from all 
11 functions (23 df) was also not significant. The quality of the 
curve fits by the power-exponential theory is especially en-
couraging when one notes that the observed values of d′ are 
by necessity group scores rather than being based on individ-
ually computed scores such as Wickelgren obtained from con-
tinuous recognition memory experiments.
Thus, it can be said that Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 
1977, 1979) power-exponential theory has met all three criteria 
set out earlier for any theory of forgetting to have potential fo-
rensic applicability. The theory provides an estimate of initial 
memory strength, predicts accurately where future points will 
fall on the forgetting function as retention interval increases, 
and satisfactorily fits functions based on group data. Before 
considering the forensic applicability of Wickelgren’s (1975, 
1977) theoretical forgetting function, however, we should first 
note some additional aspects of its theoretical utility.
Further Theoretical Observations
Faces as a stimulus category. Finding a theory that fits face rec-
ognition memory forgetting functions has been rewarding in 
terms of a number of additional insights gained, insights ac-
crued beyond the mere promise of having a more precise ac-
counting of the loss in fidelity for the memory representation 
of the once-seen face. One particularly intriguing finding is that 
not only is virtually the same value of the time-decay parame-
ter required to fit the power-exponential theory to each of the 
11 empirical forgetting functions but it is an order of magnitude 
smaller than the value required by Wickelgren (1975) to fit for-
getting functions for common English words and pictures of 
common objects. Apparently, there is a more rapid rate of de-
cline in trace fragility (a more rapid rate of increase in trace con-
solidation) for unfamiliar faces than there is for episodic traces 
of familiar English words and pictures of familiar objects. Thus, 
even though face recognition memory forgetting functions may 
be fit by the same theory as forgetting functions for words and 
objects, episodic memory for unfamiliar faces may decline more 
slowly. As Deffenbacher (1986) noted, perhaps this phenome-
non should not be all that surprising, given selection pressures 
in the evolutionary history of our species to promote efficient 
processing of faces. After all, faces constitute a very important 
category of stimuli, providing a very rich source of socially rel-
evant information, continually requiring all of us to make fine 
discriminations among them, and needing a relatively large 
quantity of human cortex to be devoted to their processing (e.g., 
Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992). Our finding that memory 
representations for the unfamiliar face may be consolidated 
more rapidly than for certain other visual stimulus classes rein-
forces the notion that faces may not be unique stimuli but they 
are at least somewhat special (Ellis & Young, 1989).
Cross-race effect
A second interesting byproduct of our theoretical search is 
revealed as a result of our fit of the power-exponential theory 
to two forgetting functions provided by the data of Chance 
and Goldstein (1987; see Table 2). Here we have additional il-
lumination of mechanisms underlying the cross-race effect, a 
forensically relevant phenomenon whereby once-seen faces of 
another race or ethnic grouping are discriminated from one 
another less well and later recognized less well than are once-
seen faces of the observer’s own race (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001). Chance and Goldstein’s observers were Caucasians ex-
posed to Caucasian and Japanese faces, blocked in counter-
balanced order by race of face. The statistically reliable cross-
race effect obtained here was clearly due to superior encoding 
of the Caucasian faces. This effect was documented by an ini-
tial memory strength superiority of approximately 1 d′ unit 
for Caucasian faces when encoded by Caucasian observers 
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as compared with the initial memory strength engendered by 
their encoding of Japanese faces. It is also of interest that even 
though Japanese faces were consolidated at the same rate as 
Caucasian faces, requiring the same value of the time-decay 
parameter for a fit of theory to forgetting function, the forget-
ting function for the Japanese faces required a value of the in-
terference parameter 10 times as great,10−7 versus 10−8. This 
finding provides support for the view that same-race faces are 
more easily discriminated from one another than are other-
race faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001), providing an oppor-
tunity for them to be encoded in a more discriminating fash-
ion, yielding thereby at least some of the encoding advantage 
for same-race faces. Same-race faces would therefore likewise 
be expected to withstand better the ravages of interference 
generated by subsequent encounters with other faces during 
any particular face’s retention interval. Indeed, Meissner and 
Brigham (2001) found that cross-race effects were greater at 
longer retention intervals.
Target face exposure. The effect of increases in target face ex-
posure time is illuminated by our fit of Wickelgren’s (1972, 
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory to two forgetting functions 
yielded by the work of Ellis and Flin (1990). Examining the 
face recognition memory functions generated by two different 
groups of 10-year-old Scottish schoolchildren (Table 2), one 
group having an encoding time of 2 s per face and the other 
having encoding time of 6 s, we observed that the extra 4 s of 
encoding time provided an initial memory strength advantage 
of about 0.20 of a d′ unit. This initial advantage leveraged a 
memory strength advantage of 0.50 of a d′ unit at a 7-day re-
tention interval. A recent meta-analysis by Bornstein, Deffen-
bacher, McGorty, and Penrod (2007) has confirmed that lon-
ger exposures of target faces are associated with both higher 
hit rates (r = .23) and lower false alarm rates (r = −.12). Clearly, 
more research is needed in an effort to try to establish just how 
much additional initial memory strength can be purchased by 
n additional seconds of exposure time.
Age differences. Still another phenomenon of face recognition 
memory is the age effect associated with efficiency of face pro-
cessing, such that older children show superior memory for 
faces. It would appear that the age effect associated with the 
greater recognition memory shown by Ellis and Flin’s (1990) 
10-year-olds with 2 s of encoding time per face as compared 
with 7-year-olds with the same 2 s of encoding time is strictly 
due to the former being able to encode unfamiliar faces more 
effectively in the time available, yielding an initial memory 
strength advantage of 0.65 of a d′ unit (Table 2). Up until the 
middle teen years, face recognition memory shows continual 
improvements in the ability to discriminate same-race faces 
from one another and later to recognize them (Chance & Gold-
stein,1984). Thus, 10-year-olds have had another 3 years of fine 
tuning of their brain’s perceptual learning “machinery,” per-
mitting enhanced ability to respond to more subtle differences 
among faces they typically encounter.
Failures to find retention interval effects
Finally, power-exponential theory can help us to under-
stand at least one potential contributor to the frequent failure 
to find statistically significant retention interval effects for face 
recognition memory. Clearly, one factor in producing find-
ings of a lack of a statistically reliable effect of forgetting oc-
curs primarily when just two retention intervals are measured 
and both intervals are at points on the forgetting function be-
tween which little forgetting would be expected to occur. Al-
though it is more informative to test retention at more than 
two intervals, if only two intervals are to be tested, investi-
gators should at least ensure that one occurs within minutes 
after encoding, given the relatively rapid roll-off in memory 
strength in the first minutes after encoding. After all, memory 
strength for the once-seen face loses 15% of its strength in the 
first 10 min of the retention interval. Consider an illustration 
provided by the data from Wixted and Ebbesen (1991, Exper-
iment 2, 11-s stimulus duration condition); see Table 2. Note 
that there was about a 12% loss of original memory strength 
(d′ = 2.47) between Day 1 and Day 7. However, the actual 
amount of original memory strength lost since encoding was 
about 41%. If one were to have only measured face recogni-
tion memory at the Day 1 and Day 7 intervals, one would have 
underestimated the actual amount of forgetting by a factor of 
more than three to one. Hence, Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 
1977, 1979) power-exponential theory and its ability to pro-
vide an estimate of original memory strength permits us to see 
clearly that just where retention intervals fall on the theoretical 
forgetting function will affect the likelihood of finding statisti-
cally reliable amounts of forgetting.
Forensic Applicability of Power-Exponential Theory
As we indicated in the introduction to this article, to make 
a proper assessment of the strength of an eyewitness’s cur-
rent memory representation, a trier of fact needs to have an es-
timate of the witness’s initial memory strength, to know the 
length of the retention interval, and to understand the nature 
of the forgetting function for the once-seen human face. As re-
tention interval length can usually be specified with some pre-
cision, acquiring an estimate of the eyewitness’s initial mem-
ory strength and a knowledge of the precise nature of the 
forgetting function represent the key forensic needs.
Let’s consider the latter forensic need first. Psychologists are 
now able to provide a much greater degree of specific knowl-
edge to the trier of fact as regards the nature of the forgetting 
function for human face recognition memory. It turns out that 
we can now offer the judge or juror an estimate of what pro-
portion of memory strength, regardless of its initial value, re-
mained at the time the eyewitness’s memory for the perpe-
trator was tested. We can do this for three reasons. First, we 
have clearly demonstrated the ability of Wickelgren’s (1972, 
1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) power-exponential theory to fit forget-
ting functions that have included retention intervals ranging 
in length from 1 min to nearly 1 year. Second, we have dem-
onstrated the remarkable constancy of the value of the time-
decay parameter (.025) needed for a fit. Third, we have like-
wise demonstrated the relatively narrow range of values of the 
interference parameter needed for a fit, practically all falling 
within an order of magnitude of each other, 10−7 to 10−8. For a 
conservative estimate of the proportion of remaining memory 
strength, we can simply plug into Wickelgren’s (1975, 1977) 
equation given earlier in this article the values of the forensi-
cally relevant retention interval (in seconds), the value of the 
time-decay parameter at .025, and the value of the interference 
parameter at 10−8; if a case involves a cross-race identification, 
the interference parameter should be instead set at 10−7. For 
a given retention interval, the resulting calculation yields the 
estimated proportion of initial memory strength remaining. 
Having an expert on eyewitness memory be able to testify to 
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this estimate should aid the trier of fact considerably in his or 
her task of assessing the fidelity of an eyewitness’s memory 
representation. Knowing, for example, that at memory test, an 
eyewitness had only 50% of original memory strength remain-
ing would represent a real improvement in specificity over 
what could be provided by an expert before the present. More 
valid assessments of eyewitness credibility can only increase 
the quality of justice rendered by a trier of fact.
Let’s now return to the other key forensic need for triers of 
fact to be able to add precision to their assessment, the need for 
an estimate of initial memory strength for the perpetrator’s face. 
Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) theory of forgetting 
is indeed unique among theories of forgetting in its specification 
of an estimate of initial memory strength. However, the forensic 
situation is neither a laboratory nor a field experiment and does 
not yield an estimate of initial memory strength.
There is, nevertheless, a way to yield a conservative estimate 
of initial memory strength for a typical eyewitness, conserva-
tive in the sense that the estimate would very likely represent 
an upper bound on initial memory strength for many forensic 
situations. The results of an interesting field experiment (Pigott, 
Brigham, & Bothwell, 1990) provide us with the opportunity. 
Pigott et al.’s (1990) participants were 47 Florida bank tellers, 
each of whom interacted with one of two men who attempted 
to cash a crudely altered U.S. Postal Service money order dur-
ing a scripted 1.5-min encounter. More than 75% of these tellers 
had training in eyewitness techniques but were not made aware 
that their encounter with the perpetrator of attempted bank 
fraud was not genuine until after their recall and recognition 
had been measured 4 hr later. Averaged across two target-pres-
ent and two target-absent lineups, their mean proportion cor-
rect was 0.55, which for a seven-alternative, forced-choice rec-
ognition memory task (six lineup members plus the alternative 
of rejecting the entire lineup) is equivalent to a d′ score of 1.41 
(Hacker & Ratcliff, 1979). It seems reasonable to account for the 
alternative of rejecting the lineup as an additional choice. After 
all, for a target-absent lineup, the correct choice is rejection of 
the lineup. If this had not been done in the present instance, the 
six-alternative, forced-choice d′ would have been 1.30.
If we substitute 1.41 for the value of m in Wickelgren’s 
(1975, 1977) equation and solve for L, we come up with a very 
plausible estimate of initial memory strength for the bank 
teller eyewitnesses of Pigott et al. (1990), d′ = 1.79, equiva-
lent to 67% correct on a seven-alternative, forced-choice task 
(Hacker & Ratcliff, 1979). After 4 hr, then, memory strength 
for the perpetrator of attempted bank fraud was just 79% of 
what it had been originally. Had the tellers not been tested un-
til a week after the encounter with the perpetrator, memory 
strength would have been approximately d′ = 1.24, equivalent 
to a predicted performance score of 49% correct—considerably 
lower, although still better than chance.
The d′ value of 1.79 plausibly represents an upper limit for 
initial memory strength for eyewitnesses in many forensic sit-
uations, at least for those not having a highly distinctive or 
memorable perpetrator. That is, it is fair to say that the foren-
sic scene for Pigott et al.’s (1990) bank tellers represents a close 
to optimal situation for an eyewitness. Consider that the per-
petrator was in full view for 1.5 min, an amount of target ex-
posure greater than the “critical value” of 1.0 min noted by 
Valentine, Pickering, and Darling (2003) in their massive study 
of lineups conducted by the London Metropolitan Police. The 
banks were well illuminated. The perpetrators were not dis-
guised. There was no alternative focus of attention present 
that might ordinarily have been expected to draw the teller’s 
attention away from the perpetrator’s face, such as a weapon; 
only the face of the money order proffered by the man try-
ing to perpetrate bank fraud required some attention. Tellers 
should not have been operating under high stress levels, given 
the absence of any personal threat to them.
To the extent that one or more of the optimal conditions of 
the Pigott et al. (1990) study are not met in any given foren-
sic situation, then, the predicted initial memory strength for an 
eyewitness should be less than the figure of 67% correct pre-
dicted for the Florida bank tellers in Pigott et al.’s field exper-
iment. Until further research is conducted—testing three or 
more retention intervals and the effect of varying durations of 
target person exposure, target person distinctiveness, and il-
lumination levels, for instance—conservative advice to a trier 
of fact would be that the typical eyewitness viewing a perpe-
trator’s face that was not highly distinctive would be expected 
to have no more than a 50% chance of being correct in his or 
her lineup identification (six-person lineup) at a 1-week de-
lay. Clearly the trier of fact would still need to consider other 
specific facts of the case to decide how much less than 50%, 
if any, the chance of a correct identification might be in these 
less than optimal witnessing conditions. Retention interval 
benchmarks other than 1 week can be readily calculated, of 
course, using Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) the-
ory of forgetting and the data provided by Pigott et al. These 
calculations do assume that the lineup’s construction and ad-
ministration have been conducted fairly. However, a post hoc 
assessment of lineup fairness is relatively straightforward 
(Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-Surrett, 2007).
To illustrate in particular the need for more research on the 
relationship of variations in target face distinctiveness to ini-
tial memory strength, consider the results of using power-ex-
ponential theory to predict initial memory strength for the eye-
witnesses in the field studies of Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, 
McFadzen, and Christenson (1990). Averaging across four dif-
ferent photo lineup conditions and 212 retail clerks, perfor-
mance was at a level of 76% correct at a 48-hr retention interval, 
equivalent to a d′ of 2.10. Using this value of memory strength 
to estimate initial memory strength, we find a d′ value of 2.87 
(91% correct), considerably higher than the 67% correct initial 
memory strength figure predicted for Pigott et al.’s (1990) bank 
tellers. Predicted performance level for Read et al.’s clerks would 
have been 73% correct at a memory test delay of 1 week, equiv-
alent to a memory strength value of d′ = 1.98. However, because 
only one perpetrator was used across the four different 48-hr re-
tention interval conditions to which Read et al.’s clerks were ex-
posed, it may well be that their higher performance level than 
that obtained by Pigott et al.’s (1990) eyewitnesses and those in 
other field experiments was due to the single perpetrator hav-
ing a rather distinctive, and hence memorable, face.
Conclusions
Psychological science is now in a position to offer the trier 
of fact more than vague generalities regarding the relationship 
between retention interval and strength of the memory repre-
sentation for the once-seen face. The results of our meta-anal-
ysis confirm that there is indeed a statistically reliable associ-
ation between longer retention intervals and decreased face 
recognition memory, an association equally true of face recog-
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nition memory and eyewitness identification studies. That is, 
there is an increase in positive forgetting as the delay increases 
between encoding of a face and test of one’s memory for it.
The present meta-analytic review of the literature also pro-
vides support for Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) 
theory of forgetting from recognition memory, using data 
from studies of memory for once-seen faces that used diverse 
methodologies and a wide range of retention intervals. Fitting 
Wickelgren’s power-exponential theory to 11 different empir-
ical forgetting functions providing group data resulted in sta-
tistically satisfactory fits, fits predicting where future points 
will fall on the function as retention interval increases. In addi-
tion, power-exponential theory provides an estimate of initial 
memory strength. This latter feature of the theory, particularly 
useful when applied to the results of field studies, permits cal-
culation of not only an estimate of initial memory strength (d′) 
but also calculation of a strength estimate at any given reten-
tion interval. Hence, not only can percentage of initial memory 
strength remaining be determined at any retention interval, 
but the strength estimate at a particular retention interval can 
also be readily translated into a probability of being correct on 
a fair lineup of a specified size. Of course, to be practically use-
ful, these estimates would need to be calculated for and clearly 
explained to the trier of fact by an eyewitness memory expert.
When considering the applicability of our findings, at 
least two concerns might be raised. First, throughout this ar-
ticle, we have assumed that the amount forgotten is a func-
tion of the current strength of the memory representation. It 
could be objected that what is remembered is also very much 
determined by retrieval conditions, such as the type of mem-
ory test. Recognition memory tests are often more sensitive 
measures of memory than are recall tests for the same mate-
rial, for instance. Furthermore, the encoding specificity prin-
ciple proposes that the amount of forgetting at retrieval is a 
function of the degree of match between encoding context 
and retrieval context. Although we do not deny the validity 
of these objections, we do not see them as problematic for the 
applicability of Wickelgren’s (1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979) 
theory to eyewitness memory. For one thing, the retrieval 
tasks in the studies we have reviewed, eyewitness identifica-
tion memory tests and laboratory face recognition tests, differ 
somewhat but are still essentially tests of recognition mem-
ory. One of our moderator analyses showed that type of re-
trieval task, recognition memory or eyewitness identification, 
was not a moderator of effect size for the correlation between 
retention interval length and memory strength. In addition, 
even though the match of encoding and retrieval context is 
typically greater for recognition memory tasks than for eye-
witness identification tasks, this difference did not affect the 
strength of the relationship between retention interval and 
memory strength, either. Furthermore, Wickelgren’s theory 
was equally effective at predicting memory strength at any 
given retention interval for both eyewitness identification 
and face recognition memory studies.
A second concern that might be raised relates to the fact 
that our curve-fitting exercise could only be applied to 11 for-
getting functions from just eight published studies. The ro-
bustness of the data sets underlying these 11 functions clearly 
depends on the overall quality of the eight published papers. 
Our considered judgment is that there is little to be concerned 
about in this regard. Quality of fit of theory and data shows no 
obvious relationship to any perceived differences in quality of 
publication source or any minor differences in quality of meth-
odology and data analysis.
In any event, psychologists interested in the psychology 
of testimony now have much more abundant direct evidence 
bearing on their belief that the forgetting function for the once-
seen face is Ebbinghausian in nature (cf. Kassin et al., 2001): 
Rate of memory loss for an unfamiliar face is greatest right af-
ter the encounter and then levels off over time. Psychological 
science can now also provide to both these same psychologists 
and triers of fact rather more specific details concerning the 
decline and fall of a face’s memory representation over time 
and succeeding facial encounters.
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